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A THEORY OF VERTICAL POLITICAL
INTERACTION IN CIGARETTE TAXATION
KHAWAJA A. MAMUN*

Abstract
This paper examines the political interdependence offederal and state cigarette tax
rates. We develop a lobby group model where a state's endogenous reaction to a federal
cigarette tax hike depends crucially on the political responses of the cigarette producer
and anti-smoking lobby groups.
Keywords: Vertical Tax Externalities; Cigarette Taxation; Eiscal Federalism;
Lobbying; Political Economy
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Recently, the literature on taxation has begun to examine the role of vertical tax
interactions in federal systems.^ However, this literature has largely ignored the
role of important political economy forces such as lobbying by special interest groups,
and policymakers that are not simple welfare maximizers but also value political
support. In an empirical study of gasoline and cigarette tax in the U.S., Besley and
Rosen (1998) incorporates the importance of the state tobacco and gasoline industries
as controls. However, their analysis did not originated from any theoretical study.
This paper seeks tofillthis gap in the literature. In particular, we study theoretically
the implication for the political determination of state cigarette taxes of changes in
the federal cigarette tax rate. Oiir contribution will help understand and predict
states' response to federal tax reforms (aimed, for example, at reducing teen smoking).
We develop a model where both a cigarette producer lobby and an anti-smoking
lobby seek to infiuence the state government choice of the cigarette tax. The semibenevolent state government values both social welfare and campaign contributions,
and the lobbies offer prospective campaign contributions in return for a more
favorable state tax rate. Wefindthat a federal cigarette tax hike reduces the lobbying
effort of both lobby groups, because their stake in the policy outcome declines as
output falls. Moreover, an increase in the federal tax also infiuences how the states
Department of Economics & Finance, John F. Welch College of Business, Sacred Heart University,
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address the welfare concerns of its citizens. Thus, the final result on the state
cigarette tax depends on the relative size of these effects.
The rest ofthe paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. The
theoretical results are described in Section 3. Section 4 provides a brief conclusion.
II. MODEL

Consider a federal system with n identical states. Each state is populated by two
types of individuals: nonsmokers and smokers, denoted hyj and i, respectively. The
total population is normalized to one, out which a share \ are nonsmokers and a
share (1-X) are smokers, respectively. We assume that both nonsmokers and smokers
consume a numeraire good z, with price normalized to unity. In addition, smokers
consume cigarettes at a price P. Every individual is endowed with a unit of labor, I.
The numeraire sector requires labor input only. Assuming an input-output coefficient
equal to one in the numeraire sector, the wage rate is fixed at unity.
Cigarette consumption is taxed by two levels of government (as is the case in
the U.S.). (i) The state government imposes a cigarette tax equal to If. The resulting
tax revenue is used to provide a state level public good, M% enjoyed by the state's
entire population, (ii) The federal government imposes a cigarette tax, t^, which is
taken as exogenous by each individual state's citizens, as well the state lobby groups.
The tax revenues are used to provide a federal-level public good. While it is well
established that smoking has long-term health consequences, in this paper we focus
on the determination of cigarette taxes by incumbent politicians with short timehorizons. Thus, we ignore (as do most politicians, see Farrelly et al. (2003) and Lien
and Evans (2005) for a discussion on the revenue reasons behind state taxation)
the effect of smoking on smokers' (and non-smokers') in-period health. We believe
long-term health considerations are largely tangential to the selection of state
cigarette tax rates in the U.S.
Each smoker i has a quasi-linear utility function
U^z + u'{oà) + M^ + Mf
(1)
where x' is cigarette consumption, M^ is the level ofthe state government provided
public good (such as local roads, e.g.), and M'^is the level ofthe public good provided
by the federal government (such as national security, e.g.). Each nonsmokerj has a
utility function given by

where 9 represents the rate at which the nonsmokers suffer disutilityfi:-ompassive
smoking. Cigarettes are assumed produced by a non-competitive industry using labor
and a sector-specific factor.^ Oligopoly firm ^'s output level equals g*, and it has a
costfiinctiongiven by ciq''), where c'> 0, c" > 0. Industry output equals 2-i^ ~"- The
gross profit function of firm k (disiregarding political expenditures) equals:
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(3)
where P{Q) - t^ - t^ equals the market price net of state and federal cigarettes
taxes. From the FOC of (1), it follows that we may write Q{t^, iO. Note also that M^
^, and M^=nQt^.
Lobby Groups
We assume that two opposing lobby groups are (exogenously) formed in each state.
First, all firms are assumed to form a cigarette manufacturing lobby (producer
lobby), where each firm contributes equally to the lobby's attempt to infiuence the
state government's decision on the state cigarette tax.^ Second, a share r\ of the
nonsmokers in each state is assumed able to overcome free-riding problems and
form an anti-smoking lobby.*
We now turn our attention to the explicit political process. The state cigarette
tax is determined by a two-stage extensive form game between the incumbent state
government and the two lobby groups (see Grossman and Helpman, 1994). In the
first stage, the producer and the anti-smoking lobbies offer prospective contribution
schedules A^(i^) and A''(i^), respectively, to the state govemment in retum for a more
favorable tax policy, f. In the second stage, the govemment selects its optimal tax
policy f and receives the contribution associated with the policy selected. It is assumed
that all promises are kept (i.e. the lobby groups are assumed not to renege on their
promises in the second stage). Given the cigarette tax, firms set their output level.
The firm lobby has an objective function that depends on aggregate profits,
gross of campaign contributions.

a'{n^j:n\

(4)

k

and the objective function of the anti-smoking lobby, gross of campaign contributions,
equals
= XT]ÍI - QQ + M^-i-Mf)

(5)

The state government's objective function is the weighted sum of campaign
contributions and aggregate social welfare:
()

()

.

(6)

where aggregate social welfare is given by

= jP{x)dx-P(Q) Q(f,íO

o

.

^

^

g
(7)
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Term A in (7) represents consumer surplus, term B represents labor income
and public goods, and term C represents the aggregate disutility of the non-lobbsdng
nonsmokers. a > 0 reñects the government's exogenous weight on welfare relative
to campaign contributions. Following, e.g., Schulze and Ursprung (2001), a larger
a indicates a more honest government.^

The Political Equilibrium
From Lemma 2 of Bernheim and Whinston (1986) (see also Grossman and Helpman,
1994) it follows that for a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (A - (i' 1,A

U^ \,t^ 1

the following necessary conditions are required to hold:
(I)

f*

(IIA) f'
(IIB) í^*
According to condition (I), the equilibrium state tax ¿^'must maximize the
government's objective function, given the offered contribution schedules. Condition
(IIA) and (IIB) imply that f* must also maximize the joint welfare of each lobby
group and the government. Using conditions (I), (IIA) and (IIB), and performing
the appropriate substitutions, we obtain:
()

(8.1)
^

(8.2)

Equations (8.1) and (8.2) imply that the contribution schedules are locally
truthful.^ Using (8.1), (8.2) and the first order condition of (I), we obtain the political
equilibrium characterization:
)

( ) ( ) O .

(9)

i n . VERTICAL TAX INTERACTIONS
In this section, we seek to determine the effect of changes in the federal cigarette
tax on the state cigarette tax. We find the interaction between the federal and the
state tax rates by first taking the partials of expressions (4), (5) and (6), and
substituting the result into (9) to find an explicit equilibrium characterization
(not shown). Next, total differentiation of the result and simple rearrangements
3rield
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t;

A

B

H^

r^W

'

(-)

(+)

A(-)

(+)

(+)

where £)''is the second-order condition of the state government's utility
maximization in (7), and is required to be negative.' ßj < 0 represents the change
in the inñuence of the cigarette producer lobby group as the federal government
raises f. Keeping £)'' < o in mind, term A in (10) suggests that the producer lobby
reduces its pressure for a lower tax rate. The intuition is that as output
falls (with a hike in iO, less is at stake for the producer lobby (the state tax
applies to a lower output quantity), and it consequently scales back its
political gift to the state government.^'^ This has a positive effect on the
tax rate (i.e. states increases tax rates in response to a federal tax increase).
Next, since ßg > 0, term B reflects the change in the pressure of the anti-smoking
lobby, which results in a negative effect on the tax rate (with a reasoning similar
to term A).
Term C is made up of four partial effects, as part of aggregate social welfare.
From (10), the relative importance of term C is also determined by the degree of
government honesty, refiected by a. ßg < 0 and ß^ > 0 represent the change in the
infiuence of the smokers and the non-organized nonsmokers. In particular, the
state government cares less about the smokers as their consumption declines (i.e.
less welfare attention to the smokers given as their numbers declines).^" Similarly,
a lower output leads to less disutility for the non-smokers and thus they also receive
less government attention.
Moreover, the change in the government's attention to the state- and federaltax financed public goods are represented by ß^ > 0 and ßg > 0, respectively. A lower
output level reduces the marginal incentive to raise state tax revenue. Without a
revenue restriction, the state government's decision to tax cigarettes depends on
the marginal utility delivered by the state public good, versus the effect on the
marginal utility of smokers and non-smokers. With a lower output (due to the hike
in tO, the state tax raises less revenue. Finally, the federally provided public good
is also a consideration of the state government. When the federal tax increases to
provide public goods, the state tax is lowered as the federal and state public goods
are substitutes.^^
In sum, the net effect of the federal cigarette tax on the state tax depends on
the lobby groups' reactions, as well as the change in the government's welfare
considerations (weighted by honesty). Thus, the tax differences seen at the state
level thus can be explained by these various forces acted differently in different
states. ^^
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IV. CONCLUSION
This paper represents a novel approach to understanding the nature of vertical
externalities between different levels of government in the United States,
particularly as regards cigarette taxation. We develop a Iobb3dng model which
identifies several sources of vertical tax externalities, chief among them are changes
in the intensity of lobby group pressures, and the government's relative attention
to the average citizen's social welfare.
Our theoretical model fills a void in the literature of strategic interactions of
federal and state cigarette taxation. The earlier literature heavily drawn on
empirical studies, reports a zero, negative or positive correlation between these
cigarette taxes. ^^ Our paper shed light on the difference in results by pointing
theoretical possibilities of such outcomes based on lobby group efforts and
govemment's welfare considerations. It is by now widely recognized in other strands
of the literature that real world policymakers rarely behave as welfare maximizers.
The literature on vertical tax externalities has until now largely ignored this reality,
and thus we believe this paper offers a novel contribution.
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Notes
1.

2.

3.

4.

For theoretical and empirical contributions, see, for example. Flowers (1988), Boadway and
Keen (1996), Besley and Rosen (1998), Boadway et al. (1998), Boadway and Hayashi (20.01),
Goodspeed (2000), Esteller-Moré and Solé-Ollé (2001), Hoyt (2001), Keen and Kotsigiannis
(2002,2003,2004), Dalhy and Wilson (2003), Rork (2003) and Fredriksson and Mamim (2008).
The tohacco market in the United States is ohgopohsüc, and is shared hy four major companies,
namely Philip Morris, R. J. Reynolds, Brown & Williamson and Lorillard. In 2002, these
four companies controlled over 90% of total US market share. See www.oligopolywatch.com
for further details. Also, see Bamett et al. (1995) for a discussion on the oligopoly structure
of the US cigarette industry.
For simplicity, we assume that hoth tobacco and anti-smoking lobbies are lobbjdng at the
state level only. For example, free-riding problems may make coordination at the federal
level difficult. While incorporating lobb}áng at the federal level however raises interesting
issues, this is beyond this paper's goals.
Anti-smoking lobbies are active through raising awareness of tobacco's effects and costs,
helping people to quit smoking, encouraging and coordinating the product liability suits
against tobacco companies, providing legislative information and pressure on the political
office-holders, etc. Anti-smoking lobbies in the United States include the Campaign for
Tobacco-free Kids, Tobacco Control Resource Center, American Cancer Society, American
Heart Association, American Lung Association, American Dental Association, American
Academy of Family Physicians, Americans for Nonsmokers Rights, American Legacy
Foundation, Oral Health America, Partnership for Prevention, and Pharmacy Council on
Tobacco Dependence (see, e.g., Carlisle, 2003).
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5.

Dixit (1996) assumes that govemment is subject to a constraint that social welfare does not
fall below a certain level. He compares a with the Lagrange multiplier on this constraint. A
large a then implies that the constraint is more restrictive.

6.

Thus, each lobby sets its contribution schedule such t h a t the marginal change in the
contribution due to a small change in tax policy equals the effect of the tax on its gross
payoff.

7.

See Appendix for explicit expressions for D and ß^ - ß^.

8.

More than two decades of tobacco literature reports a range for the price elasticity of cigarette
demand between -0.30 and -0.50. Most empirical studies suggest that a cigarette tax hike
results in a price increase greaier than the rise in the tax. See Chaloupka (1991) and Becker et
al. (1991, 1994), Barnett et al. (1995), Heeler et al. (1996), and Chaloupka and Warner (1999).
See Equation 3 and 4.

9.

10. See term A of Equation 7.
11. Assuming both levels of government are on the left-hand sides oftheir Laffer curves.
12. For example, Florida has a $0.339 tax rate per pack since 1991, while the tax rate in Rhode
Island increased 7 times during the same time period.
13. The empirical vertical cigarette tax externalities literature indicates mixed results. Besley
and Rosen (1998) found that states response positively to a federal tax hike, while Devereux
ei al. (2007) points toward positive, negative and ambiguous response depending on the
price elasticity of demand. Lastly, Fredriksson and Mamun (2008) found that states response
negatively.
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Appendix
In expression (10), the following political pressures are represented:
Cigarette-producer lobby: ßi = (1 + « ) T : 7 < 0
ot
Anti-smoking lobby: ß2 = "(1 + a)^Ti j -6

^

+ ( 1 + e^^^ j — ^ + (l + 8^^^, j - ^ I

Welfare consideration of the non-lobbying nonsmokers: P* = ~ u l " ^ ) " ~^\ -..s-^

State revenue pressure: P 5 = -

Federal revenue pressure: ße = - j (1 - ^TI) n (l + e^^^, j—-1 > 0

Moreover, the explicit second-order of the equilibrium characterization (7) equals:
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